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FISH, FAMILY, AND PROFIT
Piracy and the Horn of Africa
Gary E. Weir
The frightening increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia since the turn of thepresent century demonstrates just how fast this kind of threat can emerge
and how severe the difficulties involved in understanding and subduing it can
be. Since 1992, in fact, there have been 3,583 piratical attacks worldwide. Ac-
cording to the United Kingdom’s House of Commons Transport Committee:
“This represents an increase from 1993 to 2005 of 168%. In the same period, 340
crew members and passengers died at the hands of pirates, and 464 received in-
juries. In 2005 alone piracy resulted in over 150 injuries and assaults and over
650 crew members were taken hostage or kidnapped.”1 Recent assaults on Japa-
nese and French vessels near Somalia and the military response by the latter in
April 2008 demonstrate the lasting significance of this problem and the com-
plexity of its roots.2
Given the definition of piracy crafted in the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), most activity characterized by that name
over the past decade actually comes far closer to armed robbery than actual pi-
racy.3 In Malaysia and Indochina, traditional hotbeds of this practice, most inci-
dents reported by the International Maritime Bureau (or IMB, a division of the
International Chamber of Commerce, or ICC) actually take place at the pier,
while the ship rests at anchor, or in territorial waters, a distinction often not
made in gathering the statistics.
The nature of this definitional problem in its Somali form presents a contrast
with the historical Asian paradigm. Pursuit, seizure, and deprivation at sea in
waters bordering the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean fall more clearly than
the Asian events into the UNCLOS definition of piracy. This kind of lawlessness
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has always presented political and international complexities, made more diffi-
cult by national jurisdictions, corporate motives, and the scattered geography of
the broader Asian region. In the Horn of Africa, part of the considerable expanse
patrolled by U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command and Combined Task Force
150, the geography and the jurisdictional difficulties, while not simple, do not
present the same level of complexity.
The proximity of politically unstable nations or territories has regularly
emerged as both cause of and permission for armed robbery or piracy at sea.4 The
northeast and eastern coasts of Somalia, at the Horn of Africa, have caught the
attention of the IMB, which reported a very “alarming rise” in what it called pi-
racy beginning in midsummer 2005. Somalia’s internal unrest, its lack of gov-
ernment control, and the authority of local clan warlords have created a
favorable climate for maritime crime, one that often gives thieves and pirates
permission to act freely.
The IMB has called for a combined response and solution—that is, interna-
tional naval assistance, especially along the Somali coast. It also initially encour-
aged merchant masters and navigators to observe a coastal approach limit of at
least fifty nautical miles. The threat to international commerce extends to cargo
and container ships, oil tankers, and even United Nations food and medical sup-
ply ships. In the Gulf of Aden, in the Indian Ocean, and off the Somali coast, the
uncontrolled activity of maritime criminals also presents a threat to the traffic
that supports American forces in Iraq. However, in evaluating the event statistics
collected by the IMB, one needs to remember that profitability and the safety of
business interests drives the ICC, making it eager both for peace and for some-
one to bear most of the cost for piracy countermeasures.
In September 2001, a group of nations agreed to form Combined Task Force
(CTF) 150 in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which
committed them to regional patrols as part of the global war on terrorism. The
task force members include the United States, Pakistan, Australia, Great Britain,
France, and Netherlands, among others. The French very early began escorting
UN World Food Program ships into Mogadishu.5
BACKGROUND TO PIRACY IN SOMALIA
Historically, the IMB request for combined assistance resonates with the
nineteenth-century American experience against privateers and pirates based in
northern Africa and the Caribbean Sea. Two hundred years ago, the United
States needed logistical bases so that its armed forces could operate in the Medi-
terranean, thousands of miles from home. As the nineteenth century dawned,
British-held Gibraltar became an essential logistical base for U.S. operations
during the Barbary Wars. In that same conflict, the loan of shallow-draft vessels
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from the Kingdom of Sicily also enabled the U.S. Navy to operate in shallow wa-
ters to enforce a blockade of Tripolitan ports. In this war, cooperation with local
authorities and collaboration with allied navies made success possible. This for-
mula brought success once again when the U.S. Navy worked closely with the
Royal Navy in the 1820s against Caribbean piracy.6
During that same century and on the other side of the world, the Italians,
French, and British controlled the Horn of Africa. The latter nation took the
lead, due to the authority of the Royal Navy and the proximity of both imperial
India and the presence of a British resident authority in Aden. Thus, the United
Kingdom effectively exerted control over the strategically significant Somali
Basin and the Gulf of Aden, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. A formal
protectorate emerged as British Somaliland, with the governing authority in
nearby Aden administering British interests through 1905.
British authority in the area survived World War I, and the presence of signif-
icant air and naval power through the 1920s permitted the United Kingdom to
sustain its position there. Losing control for just a short time to Italy during the
East African campaign in 1940 and 1941, British forces once again asserted im-
perial authority and retained control of the region until both independence and
unification with Italian Somaliland gave birth to the Somali Republic in 1960.
This infant democracy lasted only nine years before succumbing to a coup and
the dictatorship of General Muhammad Siad Barre, who initially established
very close ties with the Soviet Union within the context of the Cold War. His loy-
alties later shifted when neighbor and traditional enemy Ethiopia allied itself
with the Soviet Union.
Control over local waters provided a foundation for the local economy and
the only hope of prosperity. Siad Barre maintained a small maritime force to
protect the enormously rich fisheries in Somali waters, to sell (at a profit) fishery
licenses to foreign companies, and to monitor access to regional ports that
served the import and export trade through this strategic region south of the
Red Sea and Suez. The humble Somali maritime force guarded these resources
and also restricted the traditional regional tendency toward piracy and maritime
crime. But when the Siad Barre regime collapsed in 1991, everything changed.
The evaporation of the Siad Barre regime opened the door to a period of in-
stability. The naval task force associated with United Nations peacekeeping op-
erations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) between 1991 and 1995 managed to
monitor effectively the considerable maritime traffic through the important
lanes of passage off the Horn of Africa. These routes historically cater to ships
moving from Africa into the Gulf of Aden–Red Sea area. In most cases ships
passed fairly close to the Somali coast to effect more economical passages. For
each large modern merchant bottom that plies these waters one can also find
W E I R 1 7
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many more ships traditional to the region carrying cargo along routes regularly
employed for centuries. Many of these vessels are the large cargo dhows so com-
mon in those waters.
Before unrest closed destinations or made calls too risky, a number of Somali
ports regularly played host to ships moving through this portion of the Indian
Ocean. These included Kismaayo, El Aolde, Merca, and El Maan. Mogadishu
played this role as well until it was closed to foreign vessels in 1995. When the
United Nations forces left in 1995, Somalia had no effective government, could
not continue monitoring the waters off its coast, and descended into a period of
clan warfare.7
PIRACY AND ECONOMIC SURVIVAL
The chaotic situation ashore and the damage inflicted on the country’s economy
and infrastructure had a very significant effect at sea. For many of the coastal vil-
lage communities, offshore fishing represented a regular and significant liveli-
hood. These small businessmen and their families depended completely on the
rich fishing off the Somali coast as a source of treasure going back generations.
In these cases the fishermen operated from small dhows, wooden canoes or
boats, or more recently modern small boats, such as motorized fiberglass skiffs.
They would use traditional techniques, for the most part gathering their catch
using nets and then off-loading the take for sale upon returning to shore.8
The collapse of the Somali central government in 1995 opened the region to
uncontrolled foreign exploitation. Large commercial fishing vessels began
working off the Somali shoreline and very often inside the country’s territorial
waters and traditional domestic fishing areas. These large-scale fishing ships
dwarfed the boats of the local fishing fleet and placed in danger a coastal subsis-
tence economy based on traditional fishing practices.9 The high-seas piracy
problem emerged from this context.
When violence first erupted between these conflicting interests in 1995, it
came as a surprise to no one. Many pirates armed themselves with weapons,
which were easily available due to the struggle for power among the Somali
clans. Somalia’s 2,060-mile-long coastline was soon considered to be one of the
“world’s most dangerous stretches of water because of piracy.”10 By 2002, the
IMB was reporting that the number of attacks had jumped from 335 in 2001 to
370 in 2002 and had increased its rating for the risk of attack from “possibility”
to “certainty.”11
PIRACY AND THE ABSENCE OF GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
The first incidents between 1995 and 2000 occurred when Somali fishermen
boarded foreign vessels and accused them of fishing illegally. The local
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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fishermen sought immediate compensation for catches taken in their tradi-
tional fishing areas. These actions occasionally took the form of efforts by local
clan militias seeking to control their neighborhoods ashore and to coordinate
actions against the foreign interlopers at sea. Many groups who boarded for-
eign vessels in this manner frequently referred to themselves as a “coast guard,”
protecting Somali waters and resources. In some cases this self-proclaimed
coast guard took the vessels in question back to Somali ports, holding their
cargoes and crews for ransom in compensation for lost revenue.
Foreign interests responded not by withdrawing but by arming the crews of
their ships, hiring security forces, or bargaining with the local warlords or clan
leaders for fishing “licenses.” The
latter came at prices high enough
to make those documents a rather
lucrative source of income for the
clans ashore. Of course, the clans
had no legal authority to offer li-
censes of any kind, but no central
government existed to set the entire problem in a national context with legal
agreements and effective enforcement power.12
In the months immediately after the fall of the Siad Barre regime, both the
Republic of Somaliland in the northern, formally British imperial, territory, and
the Puntland Autonomous Region, formed in 1998, attempted to exert control
and supervision of fishing and territorial waters. Both had rudimentary coast
guards and dabbled in the lucrative business of fishing licenses.
To the south the internal strife and the offshore issues produced a different re-
sult. The clans fought over the right to control Mogadishu and took over the ba-
sic revenue sources usually reserved for central governments. Some clan
warlords controlled the airports, others the maritime facilities and customs rev-
enue, and still others focused on the profitable business of selling fishing li-
censes of dubious legality. Piracy, as an independent and openly illegal
enterprise, developed only slowly, because clan leaders did not wish to have their
licensing businesses interrupted.
Central Somalia has produced the most aggressive forms of piracy—well or-
ganized, clan related, and determined. In this region, traditionally called the
Mugdug, poverty has reigned as long as memory serves, and the region’s lack of
resources has permitted it to escape the attention of the other regional clan war-
lords. For this area, the fishing industry provides virtually the only means of in-
come.13 Thus the people of the Mugdug suffered most from the foreign
exploitation of the coastal fishing grounds. When clashes began between local
The long-term solution to this problem must
go beyond traditional coalitions, formal alli-
ances, the power of regional neighbors, and the
destruction of individual targets.
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fishermen and the commercial fishing ventures, no clan interests or presumptive
central authority intervened to prevent uncontrolled escalation.
In the dangerous environment of the Mugdug, legitimate efforts to limit both
foreign exploitation of Somali resources and the growth of various related, prof-
itable, but often illicit businesses collectively transformed themselves into a
full-fledged venture in modern piracy. The developing piracy ring, initially act-
ing under the direction of the Habir Gedir subclan of the Hawiye clan, emerged
as a major threat to Horn of Africa commercial interests in 2004 under the lead-
ership of Mohamed Abdi Afweyne. Under Afweyne’s leadership, the organiza-
tion flourished; the town of Harardhere became the ring’s headquarters and
gave its name to this potent enterprise. In spite of the transition to piracy, an im-
portant part of the justification, openly trumpeted by those involved, remained
the need to protect from foreign exploitation Somali resources and the popular
livelihood of coastal communities. The ring, portraying any fees collected or
cargoes expropriated as legitimate products of the defensive effort, used the na-
tional turmoil and economic suffering as political and cultural cover for its illicit
activities.14
When the Harardhere ring made the leap to high-seas piracy and much larger
commercial vessels as victims, it naturally used the traditional tools available to
Somali fishermen, with a bit of tactical refinement. Its skiffs, frequently seen in
international press coverage, were employed because of the availability of small
motorized boats of fiberglass construction with styrofoam cores. These boats
litter the coastline, and the local fishermen, from among whom the Harardhere
ring recruited its members, knew how to use them.
By 2004 the pirates began to use multiple skiffs in their work. A larger skiff
provided room for provisions that might sustain a pirate crew, just as it would a
fishing party, for up to two weeks, and at a range of two hundred nautical miles.
It could also carry food and water, as well as providing the means and space for
storing and repairing fishing nets, reflecting the more traditional occupational
habits of the crew. In looking for targets, these fishermen-turned-pirates identi-
fied their prey visually. Thus, a patrol vessel or potential victim could hardly tell
the difference at distance between a pirate and a legitimate fisherman.
In approaching any vessel two smaller skiffs, each with a crew of four or five,
would place themselves astride the vessel, one to starboard and the other to port,
with the larger skiff astern in pursuit. The pirates then placed one or more of
their number on board the target vessel to intimidate the crew and clear the way
for the rest of the boarding party, which would bring the captured vessel to port
with the skiffs in tow. (In many recent cases CTF 150 patrols intercepting seized
ships have first destroyed the towed skiffs to make sure the pirates remained on
board and could not slip away.)15
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Implemented in early 2005, this technique has resulted in some failures but
also in some disturbing successes. The latter include the capture of MV Feisty
Gas, a compressed-gas transport, in April 2005 and MV Torgelow the following
October.16 These major attacks as well as an attempt to take the cruise ship
Seabourne Spirit in November 2005 drew international media attention, a warn-
ing to mariners from the IMB, and a response from international naval forces in
the area. The IMB advised all merchant masters to keep their vessels two hun-
dred nautical miles away from the Somali coast. The merchantmen most vulner-
able tended to operate at ten knots or less, in daylight, with no emergency
broadcast capability and no security force on board. Moving into Somali territo-
rial waters proved especially dangerous, since the American component of CTF
150 could not operate within the twelve-mile limit.
All three episodes also brought up the legal and tactical issue of onboard
armed security. Seabourne Spirit carried Gurkhas, former military personnel, as
security, and this fact played a role in the vessel’s ability to resist seizure. The
masters and shipping companies did not favor arming the crew, however, and
professional onboard security added expense. For many shipowners these mea-
sures also seemed to increase the likelihood of more violent clashes with pirates.
The only other option seemed increasing the size of the crew to enable more ef-
fective ship security, enhance lookout capability, and reduce the debilitating ef-
fect of fatigue. The latter had become a critical factor, because the crew had to
perform security functions in addition to its regular duties.17
ENTER COMBINED TASK FORCE 150
The presence of CTF 150, especially after the Seabourne Spirit incident,
prompted a change in pirate habits. The Harardhere group began using cap-
tured low-value vessels as mother ships for the skiffs. In this they sought the ad-
vantage of surprise, by appearing to be part of the normal commercial traffic of
the region.
In one case the U.S. Navy responded to an alert from the IMB in Kuala
Lumpur that pirates had in this way (unsuccessfully) assaulted MV Safina Al
Bisarat, a bulk carrier outside the two-hundred-nautical-mile safety zone off So-
malia’s central eastern coast. U.S. Central Command responded by sending the
guided-missile destroyer USS Winston S. Churchill (DDG 81) to investigate. The
warship located the dhow responsible for the attack, chased it down, and
boarded it, after firing some warning shots by way of persuasion. The boarding
party detained sixteen Indian nationals and ten Somali men. The Indians
claimed that the Somalis had seized their dhow six days before near Mogadishu
and had used it since to surprise and capture victims. The Navy investigated the
W E I R 2 1
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incident and discussed with international authorities the proper disposition of
the men taken from the dhow.18
Ships assigned to the patrol area of Somalia had repeated encounters with pi-
rates.19 USS James E. Williams (DDG 95) assisted the North Korean crew of MV
Dai Hong Dan in regaining control of its vessel after pirates seized its bridge in
October 2007. The Koreans had kept control of both the steering gear and the
engines, and with the assistance
of the American vessel they suc-
cessfully assaulted the pirates on
the bridge. At the same time an-
other American destroyer pur-
sued a Japanese vessel reportedly
hijacked by pirates off Somalia. As if to demonstrate the extent of the danger in
these waters, the destroyers USS Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) and USS Porter (DDG
78) responded to a call for help from MV Golden Nori, a Japanese chemical
tanker seized off the Socotra Archipelago near the Horn of Africa on 28 October
2007. When the destroyers drew near the captured ship, Porter used its main bat-
tery to destroy the skiffs being towed astern. Arleigh Burke then received permis-
sion from the tenuous transitional government of Somalia to enter territorial
waters to subdue the ship. The Navy continued to track Golden Nori until the pi-
rates abandoned it on 12 December.20
Somali national instability, of which maritime crime is one of the worst
by-products, inevitably came into direct contact with the war in Iraq. In 2005,
the IMB reported a rise in maritime lawlessness in the Arabian Sea. In spite of
the proximity of warships, the ICC reported two attacks off the Basra oil termi-
nal, two more at buoy anchorages, and another five in Iraqi waters on 19 and 20
November. In each case the perpetrators injured and robbed the crew and made
away with arms, cash, personal property, and, occasionally, some rather ad-
vanced technologies.21 In some Somali episodes the IMB and other sources have
reported the use of fast pursuit craft against commercial targets as far as a hun-
dred nautical miles out to sea. Virtually all reports confirm the use of sophisti-
cated small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, as well as crude weapons. This
activity represents a threat to life, property, and free navigation of the sea at the
southern end of an area of great concern to the U.S. Navy Central Command and
Combined Task Force 150.
The advent of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in 2006, capable of con-
fronting the clans and warlords, presented the prospect of Somalia as a haven for
terrorists but not for pirates. While some of the more radical members of the
courts supported al-Qa‘ida and had little love for the United States, they had
even less love for high-seas piracy, which they declared immoral. This produced
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for the risk of attack [off the Somali coast]
from “possibility” to “certainty.”
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a challenge to Somali pirates when during 2006 the CIC briefly managed to re-
open the port of Mogadishu without pirate interference to gather port-entry
fees and other profits. However, the CIC’s influence over piracy lasted only a very
short time. A transitional-national-government force and the Ethiopian Na-
tional Defense Force brought the brief reign of the council to a close and intro-
duced uncertainty once again.
THE WAY AHEAD
On 22 April 2008, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States called for a
United Nations resolution to support the nations determined to fight piracy off
Somalia. Only one week before, the French armed forces had captured six So-
mali pirates who had seized the French-owned luxury yacht Le Ponant and held
the crew of twenty-two for a week, hoping for ransom. The French government
had the pirates taken to France for interrogation. Apparently undeterred, an-
other contingent of pirates took a ship moving through the region from Dubai
on 21 April; in addition, the Spanish navy went off in pursuit of a seized Spanish
tuna boat taken with a crew of twenty-six off the Somalia coast. The French am-
bassador to the United Nations, Jean-Maurice Ripert, commented to the press
that his country had no desire to endanger the law of the sea; the French, Ameri-
cans, and the British, he said, simply wanted a mandate from the United Nations
to take action against piracy in the name of the international community.22 He
explained, “The idea is to give a mandate, to call on states of the U.N. to tackle pi-
racy by organizing patrols, reacting to acts of piracy, to take as many preventative
measures as possible.”23
In response to the increased threat of piracy off Somalia, on 2 June 2008 the
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1816, with the consent of Soma-
lia—which, the resolution observed, “lacks the capacity to interdict pirates or
patrol and secure its territorial waters.” This resolution authorized foreign naval
vessels to enter Somali territorial waters for an initial period of six months,
which could later be lengthened by mutual agreement. This resolution also al-
lowed foreign naval vessels to use “all necessary means” to repress acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea, consistent with relevant and existing provisions of in-
ternational law.24
This resolution may result in stopping the pirates, but it does not address the
underlying factors that created them in the first place. In looking for a solution,
we need to recall the history of the problem. The Somali situation emerged from
the exploitation of traditional fisheries and the inability of local fishermen to
preserve their resources and livelihood. Thus, the long-term solution to this
problem must go beyond traditional coalitions, formal alliances, the power of
regional neighbors, and the destruction of individual targets. An international
W E I R 2 3
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framework of common applicable law, common enforcement, and common
policy must extend beyond regional boundaries and political borders.25
Rather than reinventing the wheel, building upon existing successful civilian
fisheries agreements might present the best model for not only strengthening
those agreements but also extending them to provide greater security against
maritime crime.26 Developed in
this way, the collaboration would
feel inclusive, mostly civilian, and
military only in a minimal sense.
In Asia, the forms of cooperation
developed by the South Pacific
Forum Fisheries Agency, whose
members have already agreed to
enforcement collaboration, would certainly provide the basis for a framework
that would address piracy and armed robbery at sea.27
In the immediate region of Somalia, concerned nations might look to the Re-
gional Commission for Fisheries (RECOFI). This association counts among its
members Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates.28 Its objectives include the development, conservation,
and management of marine resources and the promotion of aquaculture. At the
same time RECOFI has decided to regulate fishing methods and gear as well as
the seasons for fishing and the extent of the catch.
Many of RECOFI’s primary concerns and goals address the issues of central
control and national sovereignty that triggered the so-called coast-guard actions
off Somalia by local fishermen. The lack of such control has generated a pool of
unemployed and desperate candidates ripe for recruitment into the pirate crews
that have turned the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden into such dangerous
places. RECOFI has also embraced the need “to keep under review the economic
and social aspects of the fishing industry.” Regardless of its present nature, large-
scale and increasingly deep-ocean piracy in Somalia originated from the desire
of poor communities to save their livelihoods. In its present form RECOFI can-
not entirely address the problem at hand, but it can certainly provide a frame-
work upon which to build. Many other agreements exist that might serve the
same purpose, and they touch every part of the world ocean.29
For their part, navies can inform and support locally enforced regional
frameworks built upon agreements like RECOFI and upon the progress made in
previous years by the Piracy Reporting Center in Malaysia, and its supporting
organizations, created in 1992. Any framework must include all nations affected,
regardless of political perspective or bilateral commitments. The same common
Control over local waters provided a founda-
tion for the local economy and the only hope of
prosperity . . . [but] the collapse of the Somali
central government opened the region to un-
controlled foreign exploitation.
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civilian and commercial interests that lead nations to agree on fisheries manage-
ment will help to address maritime crime.
More practical policy responses might include enabling both local authori-
ties and corporate countermeasures. Naval forces can provide mine counter-
measure vessels, should criminals lay mines in choke points or ports. Navies
should also offer to increase or enhance exercises, training, and cooperation to
assist regional or secondary maritime forces in undertaking these tasks. Naval
experience with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ship security systems can
help the spread of best practices in the use of methods suggested by the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, such as the Inventus UAV, ShipLoc, and Secure-
Ship. These measures would dovetail well with the strategy of supporting a re-
gional framework.
Any effort to explore a more global framework would obviously require more
multinational naval involvement. Addressing the Seventeenth International
Seapower Symposium on 21 September 2005 at the Naval War College, in New-
port, Rhode Island, Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy, then the Chief of Naval
Operations, began to explore the possibilities open to global navies: “As we com-
bine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will,
made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world. . . .
This 1,000-ship Navy would integrate the capabilities of the maritime services to
create a fully interoperable force—an international city at sea.”30 For some naval
historians the admiral’s statements seemed timely indeed. The Combined Oper-
ations Project led in 2005–2006 by the Contemporary History Branch of the U.S.
Naval Historical Center had examined the nature of effective naval coalitions
and their ability to address the varied threats on the high seas. In each of the case
studies, conducted by American, Canadian, Australian, and British historians,
communication and trust emerge as paramount. Without the trust engendered
by effective, well trained liaison officers, and frequent collaborative exercises at
sea, combined operations can quickly become exercises in futility.
Deliberate, frequent, and regular contact allowed his commanding officers to
broker the mutual understanding that served Vice Admiral Lord Nelson so well
two centuries ago. This dynamic has become even more necessary today, given
the potential contemporary barriers of language, culture, technology, and oper-
ational experience. The history of recent combined operations repeatedly
speaks to these critical but often overlooked personal aspects. In short, history
suggests that in naval operations as well as in international, civilian maritime
policy, “you cannot surge trust.”31
Human relations emerge strongly as the primary asset or resource needed to
bring peace and enforcement to the maritime commons, including the Horn of
Africa. Commodore James Stapleton, Royal Australian Navy, the naval
W E I R 2 5
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component commander in the international military response to violence in
East Timor in 1999, once made this very point in reflecting on the reasons for
success in that operation. The naval component of the multinational United Na-
tions task force supporting Operation STABILISE achieved a very high level of
interoperability. Effective communication and division of labor brought to the
effort in East Timor the kind of success currently sought off the Somali coast.
In a 2004 oral interview by the author, referring to the commanding officers
of the ships under his temporary command for Operation STABILISE, Stapleton
recalled that “they’d all come from a major exercise that was called off, the one
that I was going to go to. So they’d had time in company and they’d worked with
[USS] Mobile Bay before, they’d worked with [HMS] Glasgow . . , they’d worked
with [HMNZS] Te Kaha. . . . I’d worked with these ships before, I knew the COs, I
knew the capabilities of each of the ships. So we’d worked together pretty much
for a lot of the time.”32 Combining proved relatively easy, as the relationships re-
mained fresh and current and drew on strong common experience: “It was very
much a one-on-one . . . with every country, but the way I spoke to them and the
operation order for communications, the operation order for the flying pro-
gram . . . , was the standard NATO signal which they all have.”33
It was necessary to take measures consciously designed to build and renew the
human network among ships and people, a relationship that cannot have the fla-
vor of a single nation alone: “[I had people] from each country on my staff. . . . I
had a Frenchman on my staff, I had a Canadian or two, engineers. I had New
Zealanders. This became a problem for me then about classification, and what I
could leave lying around . . . [i]ssues like that. And what was privileged informa-
tion, and what wasn’t. . . . It does make problems, but if you don’t manage it, and
I didn’t have those guys and girls on my staff, for sure, then the coalition thing
doesn’t work.”34
All this had to become as natural as the first cup of coffee in the morning, a fit
so well engineered over time, socially and professionally, that it could become
second nature:
You hear people say, “I’m an Australian,” but people in Australia still know what you
mean when you say “I’ll have a brew,” a coffee, “I’ll have a NATO standard” (that’s
white and two [sugars]). Maybe that’s because that reflects my age . . . and I did a lot
of training in the UK. So I knew NATO, and I know the publications. But if you’re
using ATP, the tactical publications, you can talk to any navy in the world, because
everyone’s got Allied Tactical Publications. You can also use international codes. So
it was never really an issue about integration. . . . Everybody just fitted in.35
History strongly suggests that very often, ignoring these experiences, we have
placed our emphasis elsewhere or viewed naval personnel simply as extensions
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of platforms and technologies. We must recognize that the cultural expectations
shaping naval careers have long militated against the role the international com-
munity needs many officers to play—the very role that can make combined ac-
tion against Somali piracy most effective.36
As the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to an end, the Horn of
Africa needs more than ever officers who can play these roles. A three-million-
dollar ransom was paid in early January 2009 to free the Saudi supertanker Sirius
Star from Somali pirates;37 in response to that event, on 8 January Vice Admiral
William Gortney, the commander of Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command, and
of the Combined Maritime Force, announced the creation of Combined Task
Force 151, dedicated exclusively to antipiracy operations.38 Four days later Com-
modore Stapleton’s homeland announced that it would join other international
forces, including those of the United States and China, in the new mission
against pirates in the Gulf of Aden and near the Horn of Africa.39 A force ade-
quate to address the symptoms of piracy seems near. What will the cure look
like?
If navies intend to help keep the ocean open in an age of regional instability, pi-
racy, and terrorism, combined operations regularly informed by professional
historical perspective must become a permanent and essential part of naval
practice. Addressing piracy in a way that goes beyond simple retaliation has
proved very difficult. Recent historical experience in Asia suggests the ingredi-
ents of a possible solution to modern maritime crime, a solution that while nat-
urally displaying the difficulties of crafting a working formula, shows promise.
Malaysia and China have traditionally opposed combined antipiracy patrols
in the Asia-Pacific region, and their unsuccessful effort to collaborate raises a
significant question. Are patrols the answer to piracy? Given that Asian mari-
time crime mostly occurs at the pier or at anchor, many navies openly question
the efficacy of patrols. The Royal Malaysian Navy recently noted that ships, on
average, actually report attacks about ten hours after the event. By that time, a re-
sponding patrol cannot help, as the criminals might be anywhere.40
Patrols address the symptoms but not the cause. If regional agreements on
fisheries management form the basis for comprehensive security agreements to
protect resources and regional economies, navies will have to play a variety of
high- and low-profile roles to enable the agreements to take hold. Not all of the
measures taken to ensure a safe, healthy, and shared ocean will take the form of
overt naval action. Some still await definition and may recall times past when a
modest naval presence directly advanced local economic interests in many and
varied ways.41 In the end, the solution to piracy is as local as the lost livelihood of
a pirate recruit in one of the Harardhere camps along the Somali coast, and as
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global as Admiral Mullen’s international city at sea. If we can see the connection
and act on it, the region can once again find both the rule of law and a way to sus-
tain itself.
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